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Abstract 
 
Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) has now been part of the dominant medical paradigm 
for 15 years, and has been frequently debated and progressively modified. One question 
about EBM that has not yet been considered systematically, and is now particularly 
timely, is the question of the novelty, or otherwise, of the principles and practices of 
EBM.  We argue that answering this question, and the related question of whether EBM-
type principles and practices are unique to medicine, sheds new light on EBM and has 
practical implications for those involved in all EBM. This is because one’s answer to the 
question (whether explicit or implicit) affects the amount and type of funding and 
attention received by EBM, the extent to which EBM, and the generation, judgment and 
use of evidence more generally, can be appropriated by certain groups and questioned 
by others, and the extent to which truly unique socio-political developments in 
evidence, and in medicine more generally, are recognized and harnessed.  
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Concerns and debates about Evidence Based Medicine 
 
The phrase ‘evidence-based medicine’ and the acronym ‘EBM’ have been in common 
usage since the 1990’s, at which time they were introduced as a means of formalizing 
Archie Cochrane’s proposal to privilege evidence over idiosyncratic clinical judgment [1]. 
During this time, EBM principles and practices have come to have a profound influence 
on the setting of biomedical research priorities, the generation of public health and 
clinical practice guidelines and the implementation of these guidelines in practice. At 
present, all funders and publishers of biomedical research and all policymakers and 
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practitioners of clinical and public health medicine are expected to understand and 
implement the principles of EBM. 
 
Since its inception, EBM has been the subject of considerable professional and political 
debate and its principles and practice have evolved over time. There is, for example, an 
increasing recognition of the importance of integrating clinical expertise and patient 
values into evidence-based practice [2], of the need to avoid ‘cookbook’ and ‘defensive’ 
EBM practice [3] and of the need to challenge the traditional hierarchy that privileges 
randomized trials over all other study designs [4]. Whether these concerns have been 
addressed adequately is open to debate, with some seeing contemporary EBM as a 
relatively unproblematic practice and others, particularly those with a more 
philosophical or sociological bent, seeing EBM as a potentially problematic 
epistemological and socio-political movement [5].  
 
In this paper we will argue that now is the perfect time to address systematically one of 
the many questions that has been asked about EBM: whether EBM (or, more accurately, 
its principles and practices) truly represent anything new about medicine, and the 
related question of whether EBM-type principles and practices are unique to medicine. 
Put another way, we need to address systematically, using a theory of perceptions of 
novelty and uniqueness, the question of whether EBM is ‘old hat’ or whether EBM truly 
represents a paradigm shift in biomedical thought and practice [3].  
 
At first glance, this may seem to be a relatively academic question which is perhaps less 
important than questions about the kind(s) of evidence, and therefore research 
priorities,  
that are privileged within EBM [4,6,7] and questions about the ways in which EBM can 
and should be incorporated into clinical and public health policy and practice [3,6,7]. But 
we argue that perceptions of novelty and uniqueness have broad socio-political effects 
for all of those involved with EBM at the level of research, policy and practice. These 
socio-political effects include: the amount and type of funding and attention received by 
EBM; the extent to which EBM, and the generation, judgment and use of evidence more 
generally, can be appropriated by certain groups and questioned by others; and the 
extent to which truly unique socio-political developments in evidence, and in medicine 
more generally, are recognized and harnessed.  
 
 
EBM and exceptionalism 
 
To understand the link between perceptions of novelty and uniqueness and these broad 
socio-political implications, it is useful to draw on the sociological notion of 
‘exceptionalism’. This provides a means of linking the conceptualization of emerging 
phenomena—in particular judgments about their novelty and uniqueness—with the 
status given the phenomenon, its impacts and the way in which it is controlled. 
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The notion of ‘exceptionalism’ has been used by political scientists to describe the 
perception or claim that a particular social or political system (e.g. ‘America’) [8] or 
religion [9] is unique and has developed in unique ways. Bayer introduced the term into 
biomedicine when he used it to describe claims that HIV was a unique disease 
warranting a unique public health response [10]. It has since been applied to debates 
about the uniqueness, or otherwise, of genetic research and testing as compared to 
other types of medical research and testing [11]. In relation to EBM, therefore, an 
exceptionalist stance would hold that EBM is unique to, and/or novel within medicine, 
and a non-exceptionalist stance would emphasise the overlap between EBM and other 
evidence-related practices either outside of medicine, or within medicine prior to the 
advent of ‘EBM’. Debates about exceptionalism have evolved because it has been 
recognized that these stances have profound socio-political implications. 
 
Exceptionalist judgments (i.e. judgments that an emerging phenomenon, such as EBM is 
unique and/or novel) have both advantages and disadvantages. The perception that 
something is new, unique and therefore ‘special’ can create a healthy interest in the 
phenomenon, but it can also lead to a detrimentally exclusive focus on the 
phenomenon, as well as unnecessary fear and mystique. To say, for example, that 
genetic testing is a unique and novel kind of medical testing makes genetics seem 
interesting to funders of research and regulators of genetic testing. This is good for 
those with genetic diseases, but it also has the potential to disadvantage those with 
other kinds of diseases, whose concerns are relatively sidelined [12], and it can result in 
an arguably unwarranted fear of genetic testing. EBM exceptionalism might, therefore, 
result in a healthy interest in the generation and application of evidence in medicine. 
Indeed, it has been observed recently that: 
The evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement is touted as a new paradigm in 
medical education and practice, a description that carries with it an enthusiasm 
for science that has not been seen since logical positivism flourished (circa 1920-
1950) [5: 2621] 
But the resulting ‘EBM movement’ may also draw attention away from other aspects of 
medicine, and the notion that EBM is new and ‘special’ may make EBM seem 
unnecessarily mystical and inaccessible to all but the most specialized theorists and 
practitioners. This could account for the complaint, by some, that EBM has taken on an 
inappropriate degree of centrality in medical education and practice, sidelining other 
concerns, and that EBM has achieved ‘cult status’ and cannot be questioned.6  
 
Exceptionalist judgments can result also in the political ‘hijacking’ of the emerging 
phenomenon by particular interest groups, since what is new and unique can be more 
easily appropriated and ‘owned’. This can be good if a sense of ownership motivates 
action and promotes a sense of responsibility, but the effects are not always positive. 
Everett complains about the hijacking of the genetics policy agenda by the ‘genetics 
privacy movement’ [13] and it is conceivable that EBM exceptionalism has resulted in a 
similar concentration of power in the hands of those who accept and have expertise in 
the principles and practices of EBM, and has marginalized those who do not [6]. 
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Non-exceptionalist judgments (i.e. judgments that an emerging phenomenon, such as 
EBM, is part of the incremental development of a field) also have both advantages and 
disadvantages. On the positive side, non-exceptionalism allows practitioners to draw on 
insights from elsewhere rather than ‘re-inventing the wheel’. If, for example, the 
similarities between genetic testing and other forms of medical testing are recognized, 
then insights from our understanding of the issues relating to other medical tests, and 
our regulation of these testing procedures, can be applied to genetics, rather than 
generating a morass of unnecessary and possibly incomplete genetics-specific regulation 
and practice. Similarly, it could be very useful to draw on the rich insights and practical 
strategies of those who, throughout the history of medicine, have reflected on the role 
of evidence in medical practice [6]. And it could be very useful to recognize the 
similarities between the evidence-generating and evidence-applying principles of EBM 
and those of law, engineering and politics. Sophisticated debates about the nature and 
application of evidence have taken place, for example in relation to expert testimony in 
law [14] and in relation to the political assessment and management of scientific 
evidence of environmental and technological risks [15], and these debates could be 
applied to similar problems in medicine.  
 
On the other hand, taking a non-exceptionalist stance (particularly if this stance is naïve 
and ill-considered) can prevent us from focusing on what is truly unique about an 
emerging phenomenon. To say that genetic testing is simply an extension of other 
testing procedures is to lose sight of the fact that genetic testing does, arguably, raise 
novel issues relating to the stability of the information throughout life, the potential for 
information to be generated about family members, etc. Similarly, to say that EBM is 
simply the latest iteration of evidence-use in medicine might lead us to lose sight of 
what is truly new and unique about modern EBM, such as its specific prioritization of 
some, relatively new, forms of evidence-generation (RCTs and meta-analyses) over 
others1 and its grounding in ‘post-genomic’ medicine, with its generation of an 
unprecedented amount of raw data that needs to be translated (or not) into clinically-
relevant evidence. 
 
Given these implications of both exceptionalism and non-exceptionalism, it is crucial to 
be aware of whether one is taking an exceptionalist or a non-exceptionalist stance. 
What needs to be avoided is a naive position in either direction in which the effects of 
exceptionalism or non-exceptionalism are hidden, which in turn means that the 
advantages cannot be maximized and the disadvantages cannot be managed [16].  
 
 
The challenge of considering questions about exceptionalism 
 
In relation to EBM, a critical (i.e. non-naïve) stance on EBM’s exceptionalism or non-
exceptionalism would require: 
1) carefully defining EBM; 
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2) systematically comparing the principles and practices of EBM to older medical 
practices and to practices outside of medicine such as law, engineering and 
politics; 
3) deciding, on the basis of the above, whether an exceptionalist, non-
exceptionalist or mixed exceptionalist/ non-exceptionalist stance should be 
taken and 
4) harnessing the positive effects and managing the negative effects of the chosen 
stance. 
 
While the issue of novelty has previously been raised in relation to EBM2 there is limited 
evidence that the above steps have been carried out systematically in relation to EBM, 
and there are a number of reasons why this may be the case. 
 
First, there is no single agreed-upon definition of ‘EBM’. To any individual, the phrase 
‘Evidence-Based Medicine’ may refer to one, several or all of: a hierarchy of clinical 
research methods for generating evidence, a way of evaluating existing clinical research, 
a method of translating research evidence (and perhaps clinical expertise and patient 
values) into clinical and public health practice or more abstractly, as a social movement 
or philosophical construct privileging some forms of knowledge and judgment over 
others [17].  
 
Second, even where a phenomenon such as EBM is clearly defined, questions about 
uniqueness and novelty are not always easy to resolve. The ongoing question, for 
example, of whether HIV is in any way a unique phenomenon, warranting a unique 
public health response, depends upon whether one considers HIV’s scale, its affected 
populations, its mode of spread and its testing procedures to be sufficiently different to 
those of other infectious diseases. These assessments depend upon one’s 
understanding of HIV infection as well as one’s sense of what degree of difference 
constitutes true novelty and uniqueness. To some, therefore, the formalization of 
evidence generation and use that has taken place under the banner of EBM is truly a 
paradigm shift, perhaps even on the scale of a scientific revolution [1], but to others this 
may seem to be simply the latest step in the always evolving philosophy and practice of 
medicine [6].  
 
A third challenge for those wishing to ask questions about uniqueness and novelty is 
that such assessments change over time. When HIV first emerged, it was generally 
believed that infectious diseases had been conquered by medicine and that retroviruses 
did not cause human disease or cancer, so it is perfectly understandable that HIV would 
have been considered a unique phenomenon [18,19]. But now we have a different 
understanding of the disease and can, from a biomedical perspective at least, more 
easily see HIV as just one of many infectious diseases, perhaps with a few unique 
features. Similarly, EBM, as it emerged, was an unstable and apparently novel 
phenomenon that could, perfectly understandably be seen as something entirely new, 
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with the nuances of its overlap with older movements in medicine being temporarily 
obscured. 
 
Practical implications for policy makers 
 
Despite these challenges, we argue that, given the conceptual and socio-political 
implications of naïve exceptionalism and non-exceptionalism, the exercise of asking 
oneself what one means by EBM, and whether one sees EBM as being novel and/or 
unique, is an exercise worth undertaking by anyone involved in ‘EBM’. Indeed, now that 
EBM is into its third decade, and is well established and relatively stable, this is the 
perfect time to undertake this exercise.  
 
In order for this process to occur those who set EBM-based research priorities and those 
who develop EBM-based practice guidelines need to ask themselves what they mean by 
EBM today and, as a result, whether they wish to take an exceptionalist, non-
exceptionalist or mixed exceptionalist/non-exceptionalist stance on their practice. Once 
this has been achieved, EBM policies (i.e. the policies driving EBM-based research and 
practice) and educational materials (i.e. documents used to sell and teach EBM to 
researchers, policymakers and practitioners) could be reviewed in light of these 
considerations so that the advantages of the stance are harnessed and the 
disadvantages are managed. 
 
If an exceptionalist stance is taken, EBM policies and educational materials could 
emphasise EBM’s novelty and uniqueness, harness the interest that is generated by 
claims of uniqueness and novelty, and incorporate strategies to prevent EBM displacing 
other concerns in medicine, attaining ‘cult’ status, becoming inaccessible and 
unquestionable, and being appropriated by only a few powerful groups. If, on the other 
hand, a non-exceptionalist stance is taken, then EBM policies and educational materials 
could emphasise its inclusivity and draw explicitly on areas of overlap with other 
practices both within and outside of medicine. Indeed, a strongly non-exceptionalist 
stance might even result in the view that the label ‘EBM’ has outlived its usefulness, 
since it does not represent anything unique or novel, and EBM non-exceptionalists 
might argue for a return to more foundational, pre ‘EBM’ discussions of knowledge, 
evidence, judgment and values in medicine. We may, for example, wish to question the 
privileging of RCTs over other study designs [4] and, more philosophically, we may wish 
to question the notion of evidence as ‘facts’ about the world, in light of which scientific 
beliefs, and medical practices, should stand or fall [5].  
 
Whatever stance is taken, we hope that this process of carefully defining modern EBM, 
and considering it in light of exceptionalism will assist not only EBM policymakers, but 
also researchers, practitioners, patients and the general public, in navigating a terrain 
which is necessarily complex, but can be made less obscure by minimizing conceptual 
ambiguity and highlighting the socio-political implications of conceptual choices. 
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